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1. Introduction
The Special Representative to the UN Secretary-General on Business and Human
Rights (SRSG) has identified the State duty to protect against human rights abuses by
non-State actors, including business, as one of the fundamental pillars of the Framework
for Business and Human Rights [Framework].1 The Framework “rests on differentiated
but complementary responsibilities”, and is comprised of three “core principles”: the
State duty to protect, the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, and the need
for more effective access to remedies.2 However, the jurisdictional scope of the State
duty to protect is disputed. According to the SRSG, international law provides that States
are required to protect against human rights abuses by businesses “affecting persons
within their territory or jurisdiction”.3 With regard to home States:
Experts disagree on whether international law requires home States to help prevent
human rights abuses abroad by corporations based within their territory. There is
greater consensus that those States are not prohibited from doing so where a
recognized basis of jurisdiction exists, and the actions of the home State meet an
overall reasonableness test, which includes non-intervention in the internal affairs of
other States. Indeed, there is increasing encouragement at the international level,
including from the treaty bodies, for home States to take regulatory action to prevent
abuse by their companies overseas.4
This chapter will explore the scope of the home State duty to protect, and in the
process will underscore the complementary nature of the responsibilities in the
Framework. The SRSG has accepted a renewed three year mandate to “operationalize”
the Framework by “providing “practical recommendations” and “concrete guidance” to
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States, businesses and other social actors on its implementation.”5 In a recent keynote
presentation at the EU Presidency Conference in Stockholm, the SRSG highlighted the
importance of better understanding the jurisdictional aspects of the State duty to protect,
and described “extraterritorial jurisdiction” as the “elephant in the room that polite people
have preferred not to talk about”.6 Yet, in order to “achieve practical progress”, the
SRSG noted that it is necessary to “pierce the mystique of extraterritorial jurisdiction and
sort out what is truly problematic from what is entirely permissible under international
law and would be in the best interests of all concerned.”7 This chapter will seek to
contribute to this project. Beyond this, however, the chapter will explore an even larger
elephant in the room – whether, beyond permissibility, the home State duty to protect
should be interpreted to mandate the exercise of home State jurisdiction over
transnational corporate conduct in order to both prevent and remedy human rights harms.
The chapter will then briefly examine some practical applications that might flow from
this conclusion.
The chapter is structured as follows. First, the scope of the permissibility of home
State regulation will be examined under the public international law of jurisdiction. In
essence, the permissibility question asks when it is that the exercise of home State
jurisdiction over transnational corporate conduct is or is not in violation of the
jurisdictional rules of public international law. This analysis will then be evaluated from
the perspective of Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), an approach
to international legal scholarship adopted by a diverse group of scholars who are
committed to reforming the international legal system by taking seriously the experiences
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of those who self-identify as Third World.8 Second, this chapter will explore whether,
beyond permissibility, home States are obligated to comply with the State duty to protect
human rights. The international law of state responsibility will be scrutinized here. If, as
I conclude, home States should indeed be understood to be obligated to comply with the
State duty to protect, then compliance with this duty must include structuring home State
institutions so as to both facilitate corporate compliance with the responsibility to respect
rights, and facilitate access to remedies by victims of human rights abuses. These home
State institutions include export credit agencies, stock exchanges, financial institutions
and even corporate laws themselves, which together create the structural conditions of the
global economic order without which transnational corporations (TNCs) and other
businesses would be unable to operate. Finally, the chapter will explore the practical
implications of these conclusions by evaluating a single question: whether mandating that
institutional investors adhere to the UN Principles of Responsible Investment would
satisfy the State duty to protect human rights.9

2. The Permissibility of Home State Regulation
The State duty to protect “lies at the very core of the international human rights
regime.”10

International human rights treaty bodies recommend that States take all

necessary steps to protect against abuse by non-State actors, including prevention,
investigation and punishment, and provision of access to redress.11 The duty has both
legal and policy dimensions, and while States have discretion as to how to implement the
duty, both regulation and adjudication are considered appropriate measures.12 However,
according to the Framework, home States “may feel reluctant to regulate against overseas
harms” because the “permissible scope of national regulation with extraterritorial effect
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remains poorly understood.”13 Alternately, this reluctance may be “out of concern that
those firms might lose investment opportunities or relocate their headquarters.”14 As a
consequence, the SRSG has recently stated that “we have the oddity of home states
promoting investments abroad – extra-territorially, if you will – often in conflict affected
regions where bad things are known to happen, but not requiring adequate due diligence
from companies because doing so may be perceived as exercising extra-territorial
jurisdiction”.15
Many scholars analyse the permissible scope of home State jurisdiction by
framing the problem as one relating to “extraterritorial” jurisdiction.16 Yet, extraterritorial
is not only notoriously difficult to define, but is often associated with notions of
illegality.17 Indeed, continued reference to extraterritoriality may undermine recognition
of existing territorial links between home State institutional structures and the global
economic activities of TNCs, unintentionally reinforcing home State reluctance to
regulate in the first place.18 Moreover, “extraterritorial jurisdiction” is not a recognized
basis of jurisdiction under public international law.
13
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Despite this, not surprisingly, the SRSG’s EU presidency address explicitly
incorporates the language of extraterritoriality, in contrast with the Framework itself.
The following section will examine the public international law of jurisdiction using the
discussion of home State jurisdiction in the Framework as a starting point. The recent
comments of the SRSG on extraterritorial jurisdiction will then be explored, followed by
an assessment of the problem from a TWAIL perspective.

2.1 The Public International Law of Jurisdiction
The Framework proposes that an analysis of the scope of home State jurisdiction
should begin by finding a recognised basis of jurisdiction under public international law,
and then examining whether the exercise of home State jurisdiction meets an overall test
of reasonableness.19 The nationality principle is often assumed to be the most appropriate
basis of jurisdiction upon which to ground a preliminary justification for the regulation of
TNCs by home States.20

However, State practice diverges in the determination of

corporate nationality, and the factors that determine corporate nationality may differ even
within a single State as the regulatory context changes.21

Even where corporate

nationality is clear, widespread acceptance of corporate entity theory, according to which
each foreign affiliate is a separate legal entity from the parent corporation, restricts the
ability of the home State of the parent company to directly regulate foreign subsidiary or
associate companies.22

19

Framework, supra note 1, ¶ 19.
See, e.g., ZERK, supra note 16, at 106-109; DE SCHUTTER REPORT, supra note 16,
at 29-34.
21
Seck in YHRDLJ, supra note 17, at 187-188; DE SCHUTTER REPORT, supra note
16, at 30; CYNTHIA DAY WALLACE, THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND
LEGAL CONTROL: HOST STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN AN ERA OF ECONOMIC
GLOBALIZATION 132-37 (2002).
22
Corporate enterprise theory, a competing theory, is described as an emerging doctrine.
LOWENFELD, supra note 17, at 85-86; Upendra Baxi, Mass Torts, Multinational
Enterprise Liability and Private International Law, 276 REC. DES COURS 297, 399401 (1999). A home state may still regulate a parent company so that it exercises control
over a foreign subsidiary without directly regulating that entity. F.A. MANN, The
Doctrine of International Jurisdiction Revisited After Twenty Years, 186 REC. DES
COURS 19, 60-63 (1984); ZERK, supra note 16, at 108.
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While the definition of home State in essence depends upon the ability to identify
the nationality of a TNC,23 this is often done in the public international law context by
reference to “the place of incorporation” or “the place from which control over the
corporation’s activities is primarily exercised.”24 The importance of “place” suggests that
an examination of territorial links might serve equally well as a preliminary justification
for the exercise of home State jurisdiction. Instinctively, a focus upon territoriality draws
attention to the territory of the host State where the impact of the human rights violation
is felt, and to any subsidiary or affiliate corporate entity based within host State territory.
However, attention is equally due the territory of origin. The home State, as the State of
origin of foreign direct investment, will necessarily have a strong territorial connection to
conduct that takes place within home state territory. This conduct may take many forms,
including decision-making at corporate headquarters, decision-making by a government
body or private financial institution in relation to financing or insurance support, or
decision-making by a stock exchange in relation to listing to obtain equity financing.
While this conduct may not in and of itself directly cause the human rights violation, it
does play an essential supporting role without which the human rights violation could not
occur. Moreover, all of these home State institutional structures, whether conceived of as
“public” or “private,” are supported by a network of professionals, including
underwriters, auditors, analysts and lawyers, who are primarily based in a city located
within the territory of the home State.25
Once a recognised basis of jurisdiction is identified providing a preliminary
justification for the exercise of home State jurisdiction, the question remains as to
whether or not the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. In particular, does it constitute
an unacceptable intervention into the internal affairs of the host State? Incidents of
concurrent or overlapping jurisdiction are quite commonplace, indeed, they are inevitable
23

ZERK, id. at 146-151.
Id. at 147. The “nationality of owners or those having substantial ‘control’ over the
activities or operations of the corporation” may also serve to identify TNC nationality.
Id.
25
On the importance of global cities, see especially SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING
CONTROL?: SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALISATION (1996); SASKIA
SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL
ASSEMBLAGES (2006).
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in a global economic order with both host and home States.26 On the other hand,
incidents of truly conflicting jurisdiction, where it would be impossible for a TNC to
comply with the laws of both the home State and the host State, are likely to arise less
frequently in the human rights context.27 In most cases there is no true conflict between
the laws of the home and host States, but the home State’s exercise of concurrent
jurisdiction is understood as intrusive by the host State, touching matters that are
considered central to the “very idea” of state sovereignty.28
The reasonableness of an exercise of home State jurisdiction is often said to
involve a balancing of State interests, including consideration of factors such as the links
to the territory of the regulating state; the character of the activity being regulated; its
importance to the regulating state; and the importance of the regulation to the
international system.29 An alternate approach to the resolution of jurisdictional conflicts
recognises that home States may exercise jurisdiction not only to enforce their own
policy goals, but also to enforce international policy goals such as those of international
human rights law.30 According to August Reinisch, where the exercise of home State
jurisdiction could validly be described as an attempt to enforce international human rights
norms through national legal systems, the substantive international law principles of
26

Seck in YHRDLJ, supra note 17, at 192; D.W. Bowett, Jurisdiction: Changing
Patterns of Authority Over Activities and Resources, in THE STRUCTURE AND
PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
DOCTRINE AND THEORY 555, 565 (R. St. J. Macdonald & Douglas Johnston eds.,
1983).
27
Seck in YHRDLJ, id. at 192-193. A true conflict would occur only where the host
state mandates the TNC to violate human rights, not where the host state omits to regulate
the TNC so as to prevent human rights violations.
28
Craig Scott, Translating Torture into Transnational Tort: Conceptual Divides in the
Debate on Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Harms, in TORTURE AS TORT:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF
TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 45, 53 (Craig Scott, ed., 2001)
[hereinafter TORTURE AS TORT].
29
Seck in YHRDLJ, supra note 17, at 195. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 (1987); ZERK, supra
note 16, at 136-139; Bowett, supra note 26, at 566-72; DE SCHUTTER REPORT, supra
note 16, at 27.
30
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ed., 2005).
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human rights should override the formal principles from the public international law of
jurisdiction.31 In these situations, “affected states will have a hard time justifying their
disregard of human rights in rejecting the extraterritorial acts of others.”32
The most recent statement by the SRSG on the permissibility of extraterritorial
jurisdiction takes a slightly different approach.

The SRSG explicitly distinguishes

between what he describes as “true extraterritorial jurisdiction exercised directly in
relation to overseas actors or activities”, and “domestic measures that have extraterritorial
implications”.33 In the case of direct extraterritorial jurisdiction, the SRSG notes that
States “usually rely on a clear nationality link to the perpetrator”. By contrast, domestic
measures with extraterritorial implications “rely on territory as the jurisdictional basis,
even though they may have extraterritorial implications.”34 Both, according to the SRSG,
can be controversial, although domestic measures with extraterritorial implications are
most common.35 In general, “principles-based approaches” appear “less problematic than
detailed rules-based approaches”, due to “genuine legal, political and cultural differences
among states”.36
In recognition that extraterritorial jurisdiction “constitutes a range of measures”,
the SRSG ultimately proposes a matrix:
It has two rows: direct extraterritorial jurisdiction over parties or activities abroad, and
domestic measures with extraterritorial implications. And it has three columns: public
policies, prescriptive regulations, and enforcement action. The combination yields six
cells – six broad types of measures with differing extraterritorial reach – not all of
which are equally controversial or as likely to trigger objections and resistance.
Yet, the SRSG concludes, “all cells” are “under-populated”, “not only the most difficult
and controversial”.37 While the SRSG clearly acknowledges the legitimacy of concerns
expressed by home States, host States and corporations about extraterritorial jurisdiction,

31

Id.
Id. See also Seck in YHRDLJ, supra note 17, at 195.
33
Stockholm Keynote, supra note 6 at 3.
34
Id. at 3.
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Id. at 4.
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Id. at 4.
37
Id. at 5.
32
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he is clear: “the debate [about extraterritorial jurisdiction] must be had because the
business and human rights agenda ultimately is about closing governance gaps”.38

2.2 Insights from Third World Approaches to International Law
As described above, August Reinisch proposes that where the exercise of home
State jurisdiction could validly be described as an attempt to enforce international human
rights norms through national legal systems, the substantive international law principles
of human rights should override formal principles from the public international law of
jurisdiction that might suggest the home State is acting in violation of international law.
One of the difficulties with Reinisch’s proposal, however, is determining whether a home
State is in fact regulating in order to enforce an international norm, or whether its conduct
is better described as serving its own national policy goals.39 A related question is
whether home State reluctance to regulate in relation to the State duty to protect is
attributable to a lack of understanding of permissible jurisdictional scope, or whether it is
more accurately described as arising “out of concern that those firms might lose
investment opportunities or relocate their headquarters”.40 The SRSG’s recent statement
on extraterritorial jurisdiction appears premised upon the assumption that there is in fact
misunderstanding over the permissible scope of home State jurisdiction. However, if in
practice home States only exercise jurisdiction when it would serve to promote internal
economic interests, then the reluctance to implement even domestic public policies with
extraterritorial implications in the human rights realm as identified by the SRSG becomes
easier to understand, although more difficult to justify.
A TWAIL assessment of the jurisdictional rules of public international law may
be helpful here.

TWAIL, or Third World Approaches to International Law, is an

approach to international legal scholarship adopted by a diverse group of scholars who
are:
solidly united by a shared ethical commitment to the intellectual and practical struggle
to expose, reform or even retrench those features of the international legal system that
help create or maintain the generally unequal, unfair, or unjust global order … a
commitment to centre the rest rather than merely the west, thereby taking the lives and
38

Id. at 5.
Reinisch, supra note 30. See also ZERK, supra note 16, at 136-138. Zerk notes that
“the motives of the regulating state are rarely (if ever) pure.” Id. at 137.
40
Framework, supra note 1, ¶ 14.
39
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experiences of those who have self-identified as Third World much more seriously
than has generally been the case.41
While TWAIL is not a unanimous, monolithic school of thought, TWAIL scholarship is
united in its broad opposition to the unjust global order.42 Historical TWAIL scholarship
has highlighted the colonial origins of international law, revealing how despite
international law’s universal claims, it was used to justify, manage and legitimize the
subjugation and oppression of Third World peoples.43 Colonialism was central to the
formation of international law, and neo-colonialism continues to be central to the
structure of international law today through contemporary initiatives such as the
discourse of development that presents Third World peoples as deficient and in need of
international intervention.44 According to Antony Anghie, the practices of powerful
Western states following the establishment of the United Nations and continuing today
may be best understood as the “continuation, consolidation, and elaboration of
imperialism.”45 However, TWAIL scholars do not reject international law, but rather
seek to make the people of the Third World the ultimate decision makers when
identifying and interpreting international legal rules. As international law provides Third
World peoples with no real voice, TWAIL scholars “themselves must imagine or
somehow approximate the actual impact of specific rules or practices on their daily lives
and define or interpret those rules accordingly.”46 TWAIL scholars have also asked how
to define the Third World, with many concluding that a fixed geographic approach is

41

Okafor ICLR, supra note 8 at 376.
Obiora Chinedu Okafor, Newness, Imperialism and International Legal Reform in Our
Time: A TWAIL Perspective, 43 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 176 (2005) [hereinafter, Okafor
Newness]. See also Makau Mutua, What Is TWAIL 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L PROC. 31
(2000); Karen Mickelson, Taking Stock of TWAIL Histories, 10 INT’L COMMUNITY L.
REV. 353 (2008).
43
Antony Anghie & B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law and
Individual Responsibility for Internal Conflict, 2 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 77 at 187 (2003).
44
Id. at 193.
45
ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 11-12 (2005). See also BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE (2003).
46
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unhelpful; rather, the significance of Third World is tied to a sense of subordination
within the global system shared by a group of States or societies that self-identify as
Third World.47
The unilateral exercise of home State jurisdiction in the human rights realm
creates a curious problem from a TWAIL perspective. On the one hand, if home States
only exercise jurisdiction to promote internal economic goals, then unilateral home State
regulation, even ostensibly addressing human rights concerns, appears innately
problematic as an imperialistic infringement of host State sovereignty.48 Moreover, if
home State regulation designed to prevent and remedy human rights harms were to
become routine State practice that contributed to the development of customary
international law norms, it could unintentionally serve to reinforce the neo-colonialist
tendencies of international law.49 On the other hand, to the extent that neo-colonial
tendencies are already embedded within the structure of international law, the public
international law rules of jurisdiction which suggest that extraterritoriality in the business
and human rights context is illicit and a violation of international law could themselves
be neo-colonialist. The language of extraterritoriality thus shields home States from
pressure to take action to ensure home State TNCs respect the rights of citizens in Third
World host States. It also shields the home State from the fear that another home State
might take action to protect the human rights of its own Third World peoples, including
perhaps indigenous peoples.
Notably, many TWAIL scholars complain that home State courts have been
reluctant to exercise “justice jurisdiction” over TNC conduct that has violated the human
rights of communities within developing countries, while at the same time according

47

Okafor Newness, supra note 42 at 174-175. See also Balakrishnon Rajagopal,
Locating the Third World in Cultural Geography, (1998-1999) THIRD WORLD LEGAL
STUDIES 1.
48
See, e.g., B.S. Chimni, An Outline of a Marxist Course on Public International Law, 17
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 1, 19-20 (2004).
49
See further Sara L. Seck, Unilateral Home State Regulation: Imperialism or Tool for
Subaltern Resistance? 46 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 565 (2008) [hereinafter Seck in
OHLJ].
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protection to developed State investors.50

Moreover, according to Balakrishnan

Rajagopal, despite the problematic reliance of human rights discourse upon the State as
the primary duty-holder, human rights should not be dismissed.51 The problem with
human rights theory is that it is linked with the colonial origins of the doctrine of
sovereignty, for the State is given a predominant role as the source and implementer of
the normative framework.52 Consequently, the “radical democratic potential in human
rights” must be sought out, “by paying attention to the pluriverse of human rights,
enacted in many counter-hegemonic frames.”53
What might this mean?

While TWAIL calls for justice jurisdiction have

generally been made in relation to the exercise of adjudicative jurisdiction by courts, the
SRSG has correctly noted that courts are reluctant to accept these cases without clear
legislative or executive support.54 This suggests that a TWAIL analysis of home State
regulation necessitates a distinction between regulation that enables host State individuals
and local communities to seek redress from harm (and to seek to prevent harm in the first
place), and regulation that imposes home State values or standards on communities in
other States without the participation, consultation or consent of those same
communities.55 It also suggests that asking what the permissible scope of home State
extraterritorial jurisdiction is may serve to distract from the real elephant in the room:
whether State-created institutional structures of the global economic order must regulate
the TNC conduct that they facilitate so as to protect individuals and local communities
from human rights violations, and to offer access to remedies in the event of harm.

50

Chimni, supra note 48, at 20. See generally Baxi, supra note 22; Muthucumaraswamy
Sornarajah, Linking State Responsibility for Certain Harms Caused by Corporate
Nationals Abroad to Civil Recourse in the Legal Systems of Home States, in TORTURE
AS TORT 491, supra note 28.
51
RAJAGOPAL, supra note 45, at 186.
52
Id. at 187. Thus, despite its “nominal anti-sovereignty posture”, human rights remains
a “state-centred” discourse, and protest or resistance movements inside societies are
ignored. Id.
53
Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Counter-hegemonic International Law: rethinking human
rights and development as a Third World Strategy, 27 THIRD WORLD Q. 767 at 768
(2006).
54
Stockholm Keynote, supra note 6, at 3.
55
Seck in OHLJ, supra note 49.
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3. Home State Obligations
3.1 Jurisdictional Scope and the ILC Articles
The extent of home State obligations depends upon the scope of jurisdictional
clauses in international human rights treaties or as understood under customary
international human rights law. According to the Framework, international law provides
that States are required to protect against human rights abuses by business “affecting
persons within their territory or jurisdiction.”56 Thus, while territoriality could serve as a
preliminary justification for the exercise of home State jurisdiction under public
international law, territoriality does not so easily ground an obligation to regulate where
those affected by conduct supported by home State institutions are physically located in
the host State. Moreover, although nationality jurisdiction has been invoked in relation to
transnational corporate conduct in multilateral efforts to regulate transnational bribery,57
human rights treaties do not make specific mention of the scope of State obligations in
relation to TNCs.
The precise scope of obligations under international human rights law hinges
upon the meaning of “jurisdiction.”58 Despite some controversial jurisprudence from the

56

Framework, supra note 1, ¶ 18. Some States claim the scope of the duty is limited to
protecting those “both within their territory and jurisdiction”. Id. at n.10.
57
See, e.g., OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions art. 2, Dec. 17, 1997, DAFFE/IME/BR(97)20, 37
I.L.M. 1, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf (obliging State
parties to exercise jurisdiction in respect of bribery offences committed abroad by their
nationals).
58
See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31, The Nature of the
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 (May 26, 2004) (clarifying
that while Article 2(1) of the ICCPR refers to both territory and jurisdiction, a state’s
obligations extend to individuals who are not within the state’s territory but who are
subject to its jurisdiction). See Robert McCorquodale & Penelope Simons, Responsibility
Beyond Borders: State Responsibility for Extraterritorial Violations by Corporations of
International Human Rights Law, 70(4) MODERN LAW REVIEW 598, 602-605, n.25
(2007); EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (F.
Coomans & M.T. Kamminga eds., 2004) [hereinafter EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION]. See also
Smita Narula, The Right to Food: Holding Global Actors Accountable Under
International Law, 44 COLUMBIA J. TRANSNAT’L L. 691, 728-737 (2006)
14

European Court of Human Rights (ECHR),59 international human rights treaty bodies
generally support a broad concept of jurisdiction that includes where the victim is within
the “power, effective control or authority” of the State.60 This approach has also found
favour with the International Court of Justice.61 Thus, even if home State conduct is
understood as taking place on home State territory, the jurisdictional scope of the
obligation must extend to the extraterritorial effect of this conduct. In essence, the
problem rests on determining to whom a State owes obligations: merely the public within
the State’s territorial borders, or all those impacted by home State conduct? Sigrun
Skogly and other scholars have persuasively argued that universal respect for
international human rights must go hand-in-hand with universal human rights
obligations.62 Indeed, according to Skogly and Mark Gibney, “international human rights
treaty law, by definition, is premised on the notion of extraterritorial obligations.”63 The
same conclusion may be reached without resorting to the language of extraterritoriality,
however. If the primary rules that specify the content of home State obligations include
due diligence obligations of prevention and reparation of harm by non-State actor TNCs,

(discussing the jurisdictional scope of the ICESCR as extending to jurisdiction exercised
through “effective control” or international cooperation).
59
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Human Rights Obligations, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 781 (2002); Mark Gibney, Katarina
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267, 273 (Shareen Hertel & Lanse Minkler eds., 2007).
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then the home State obligations must extend to the fullest possible exercise of legal
authority by the State.64
There are no extraterritorial limitations under the secondary rules of the
international law of State responsibility as provided by the Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ILC Articles).65 Moreover,
practical considerations commonly associated with an exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction should also not create insurmountable obstacles, particularly as obligations of
prevention under the ILC Articles are “usually construed as best efforts obligations,
requiring the State to take all reasonable or necessary measures to prevent a given event
from occurring, but without warranting that the event will not occur.”66 Nor are there any
extraterritorial limitations inherent in the companion work of the ILC on the rules relating
to the prevention and remediation of transboundary environmental harm (Prevention
Articles and Loss Allocation Principles).67 The scope of this second project extended in
the early days to cover transnational harm associated with the export of hazardous
64

NICOLA M.C.P. JÄGERS, CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS: IN
SEARCH OF ACCOUNTABILITY 172, generally at 166-167, 169-172 (2002)
[hereinafter JÄGERS]. For an environmental perspective, see BRIAN D. SMITH,
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also Rick Lawson, Life After Bankovic: On the Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on
Human Rights, in EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION, supra note 58, at 83, 85-86; JÄGERS, id. at 168169; Robert McCorquodale, Spreading the Weeds Beyond Their Garden: Extraterritorial
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Symposium: Assessing the Work of the International Law Commission on State
Responsibility 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1053-1255 (2002); D. Bodansky & J.R. Crook eds.,
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(2002).
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technology by TNCs.68 While the final drafts of the Prevention Articles and the Loss
Allocation Principles were clearly designed with transboundary environmental harm in
the forefront (and as primary rather than secondary rules),69 their scope may still be read
as extending to transnational harm from a State of origin. Both thus provide for the
possibility of concurrent home and host State obligations under primary rules addressing
the problems of transnational harm.70
The fact that internationally wrongful conduct often results from the collaboration
of several States is clearly recognized under the ILC Articles.71 The wrongfulness of one
State’s actions may depend on the independent action of a second State, or a State may be
required by its own international obligations to either prevent certain conduct by another
State or to at least prevent harm flowing from such conduct.72 As a general rule, each
State is responsible for its own wrongful acts under the principle of independent
responsibility.73 Thus, both the home and host State may be independently responsible
for violations of human rights norms committed by TNCs, although the precise nature of
the responsibility may differ depending on the nature of their own obligations.74
The ILC Articles are concerned exclusively with the responsibility of States to one
another,75 and do not address the question of whether non-state actors hold international
68
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69
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Transnational Harm: Canada, Global Mining and Local Communities 290-413 (Dec.
2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University)
[hereinafter Seck PhD]. On what international human rights law can learn from
international environmental law regarding the transnational scope of obligations, see also
SKOGLY, BEYOND BORDERS, supra note 62, 49-54; John H. Knox, Diagonal
Environmental Rights, in EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS IN HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW (Mark Gibney & Sigrun Skogly eds., forthcoming 2009).
71
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Id.
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rights and obligations.76 As a result, their relevance to international human rights law is
sometimes contested.77 However, as the human rights treaty bodies themselves have
applied the international law of State responsibility to matters before them, and the ILC
Articles themselves make reference to human rights cases, the relevance of the ILC
Articles to the business and human rights debate will be presumed.78 The following
section will examine the attribution rules of the ILC Articles, which are said to reflect
existing international law, rather than being a progressive statement of what the law
should be.79 Accordingly, they may be regarded as a statement of how governments
currently perceive the international law of State responsibility.

3.2 Direct Responsibility and Attribution by Agency
Under the ILC Articles, an internationally wrongful act that would give rise to
State responsibility occurs where there is conduct consisting of an action or omission that
is attributable to the State under international law and that constitutes a breach of an
international obligation of the State.80 Scholars who have explored the question of
whether home State responsibility flows from the wrongful conduct of TNCs have often
76
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Responsibility and the European Convention on Human Rights: Role and Realm, in
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focused on asking whether it is possible to attribute the conduct of the TNC to the home
State under the Nicaragua test of effective control,81 reproduced in essence in Article 8 of
the ILC Articles.82 This test provides the nature of the link that must be established for
private acts of a TNC to be transformed into the acts of de facto State agents.83
According to Article 8, the conduct of a person or group who are “in fact acting on the
instruction of, or under the direction or control of” the State in carrying out the conduct,
will be considered an act of the State under international law.84

Notably, the

Commentaries to Article 8 explicitly exclude a State’s initial establishment of a
corporation by special law or otherwise as a sufficient basis for attribution to the State of
the entity’s subsequent conduct.85 Aside from the case of private military contractors, it
is rarely argued that TNCs are in fact acting on the instructions of the home State.86
Moreover, it is frequently said that the effective control test from the Nicaragua case is
extremely difficult if not impossible to meet in the TNC/home State context.87 While
some scholars had speculated that the effective control test had been replaced by a test of
“overall control” in the Tadić case,88 this was not accepted by the ICJ in Bosnia.89
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An alternative approach to establishing an agency relationship between a TNC
and a home State is under Article 5 of the ILC Articles, according to which the conduct of
an entity empowered by State law to exercise elements of governmental authority will be
attributed to the State.90 As the ILC Articles suggest that this attribution only occurs
where the conduct concerns governmental activity, not private or commercial activity
with which the entity may be engaged,91 Article 5 appears of limited use for attributing
TNC conduct directly to the home State. This is particularly the case as the entity must
be specifically authorised by internal law to exercise public authority.92 Having said this,
Article 7 provides that conduct is attributable to the State where a State organ or entity is
empowered to exercise elements of governmental authority and, while acting in its
official capacity, acts in excess of authority or contrary to instructions.93 It is therefore
not strictly necessary for the State to have ordered the wrongful conduct itself. Article 11
is similarly of limited use, as it requires the State to have “acknowledged and adopted the
conduct in question as its own”.94 Home States rarely, if ever, adopt human rights
violating conduct by TNCs as their own.
While the above examples suggest that direct attribution of human rights-violating
TNC conduct to the home State is difficult if not impossible under the ILC Articles, there
is at least one possible exception. Article 9 of the ILC Articles could provide a basis for
arguing that home States bear direct responsibility for harmful conduct by TNCs
exercising elements of host State governmental authority in failed States or conflict
zones.95 Article 9 is designed for exceptional circumstances, such as “during revolution,
armed conflict or foreign occupation, where the regular authorities dissolve, are
90
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Id. in Commentary to art. 5, ¶ 5..
92
Id. in Commentary to art. 5, ¶ 7. However, it is not obvious what is included in the
ILC’s definition of governmental authority, nor is governmental authority every easy to
define. See Clapham, supra note 77, at 242-243, 460-499.
93
ILC Articles, id. art. 7.
94
Id. art. 11. Article 11 is derived from the Case Concerning United States Diplomatic
and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3. (May 24). According to
Becker, Article 11 is concerned with explicit ratification and adoption of conduct by the
State, not with implied State complicity arising out of a failure to prevent or prosecute the
private offender as would be the case if it had cited older cases which supported the
condonation theory. BECKER, supra note 77, at 72. See further below.
95
ILC Articles, id. art. 9.
91

20

disintegrating, have been suppressed or are for the time being inoperative.”96 If an
extractive company exercises police powers in order to protect its property in the absence
of a functioning host State police force, and violates human rights in the process, then
this conduct may be attributable to both the incapacitated host State and the home State
under the principle of independent responsibility. The more that the home State is aware
that the host State is unable to exercise its regulatory powers, the more onerous the
responsibility might be for the home State.
Thus, generally speaking it is difficult to establish an agency relationship between
a TNC and a home State. This is in part because an agency relationship presumes that the
State is in the position of principal while the TNC is a subordinate.97 Yet, home States
are not “puppeteers” who direct the actions of TNC “marionettes.” Instead, home State
involvement is more about “acquiescence than direction and control, more about
facilitation by quiet encouragement than specific instructions, more about omission than
commission.”98 While the TNC is clearly the driving force behind its own conduct, the
home State “may be a key facilitator” of the activity through “complex acts and
omissions.”99 Thus, the use of agency as a standard for direct home State responsibility
for private actor conduct by TNCs may be “not just impractical but also selfdefeating.”100 Notably, the agency paradigm “not only neglects the subtle relationships
between the private and public sphere … it encourages them,” as States can pursue
indirect support of activities without creating an agency relationship.101
The Framework indicates that implementation of the State duty to protect may be
accomplished through regulation and adjudication of TNC conduct so as to protect
rights.102 The following section will explore an alternate route to establishing direct
96
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home State responsibility for human rights violations by TNCs, by turning our attention
to the conduct of State organs.

3.3 The Separate Delict Theory and the Conduct of State Organs
Under the principle of independent responsibility, a home State would be directly
responsible for its own wrongful conduct in failing to regulate or adjudicate a TNC so as
to prevent and remedy human rights violations – that is, failing to exercise due diligence.
However, this does not mean that the State is directly responsible for the conduct of the
TNC. This understanding of responsibility is described by some scholars as indirect
responsibility for private actor conduct,103 and by others as responsibility under the nonattribution and separate delict theory, with the term ‘indirect responsibility’ reserved for
historical cases of complicity or condonation.104

According to Tal Becker, as the

difference between a finding of direct responsibility and responsibility under the separate
delict theory makes no difference in terms of the remedy available under international
human rights law, the different theories of responsibility are often not clearly
distinguished.105 Generally speaking, however, the current “prevailing perception” of
State responsibility is that the State is:
directly responsible only for the acts of those persons with whom it is in a
relationship of agency. For this reason, the State will be responsible for the
conduct of its own organs or officials, but not for the conduct of non-State actors
that is wholly private in nature. The State can, however, be held responsible for
its own violations of a separate duty to regulate the private conduct.106
103
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The distinction between direct responsibility and responsibility under the separate
delict theory is not specifically endorsed under the ILC Articles, which instead provides
that a State is responsible for “all the consequences, not being too remote, of its wrongful
conduct.”107 However, the distinction becomes evident if one focuses upon Article 4 of
the ILC Articles, according to which:
The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under
international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or
any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State,
and whatever its character as an organ of the central Government or of a territorial
unit of the State.108
The significance of Article 4 becomes clear if conduct is understood to include
both actions and omissions, and if the home State is understood to be under a duty to
exercise due diligence to prevent human rights violations by non-state actor TNCs, and to
provide victims of human rights violations with access to justice through home State
courts. The question then becomes: which State organs are implicated by the State duty
to protect human rights – that is, which organs should be expected to engage in the
regulation of private actor conduct?

States regulate conduct in many ways, and

regulation may involve many branches of government:109
Thus, the Legislature may lay down rules by statute, or the Executive may do so
by order. … States also regulate conduct by means of decisions of their courts,
which may order litigating parties to do or to abstain from doing certain things. …
So, too, may the State’s administrative bodies, which may apply rules concerning,
for example, the issuance of licences to export goods …110
The scope of the State duty to protect under Article 4 implicates any branch of
government involved in creating and supporting the global economic order and
consequently TNC conduct. The conduct of the executive branch of a home State is
implicated when it engages in the negotiation of investment protection agreements and
107
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bilateral investment treaties with host States without regard to home State obligations to
protect human rights111 or related obligations of international cooperation.112
Government departments that provide services to support TNCs are also implicated, as
are State-owned enterprises carrying out similar public mandates.113 It follows that trade
commissioner services, overseas development agencies, export credit agencies,114 and
even sovereign wealth funds, as executive organs, must exercise due diligence to ensure
that the private actor conduct they support does not violate human rights, and that, in the
event harm does occur, victims have access to a remedy.
The implementation of non-binding policies requiring environmental, social and
human rights impact assessments, along with ombudsperson-type dispute resolution
mechanisms might seem sufficient to discharge the obligation to exercise due diligence
by executive organs. However, as the obligation to regulate also attaches to legislative
organs, legislation governing these executive organs must arguably also comply with the
duty to regulate. To the extent that governing legislation of executive organs could be
amended to mandate the protection of human rights, non-binding policies may not be
sufficient. For example, such legislation could open the door to judicial review of
decisions made by government organs where a decision is not made in accordance with a
designated procedure.115
As corporate law itself is the product of the conduct of legislative organs, it too
should be subject to scrutiny. Facilitating legislation granting separate legal personality
to a corporation must surely be in breach of the duty to protect human rights, if the grant
of legal personality is made without ensuring that the corporation is given characteristics
111
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that would enable it to respect rights. This observation highlights the complementary
relationship between the State duty to protect and the corporate responsibility to respect,
as within the State duty to protect is an obligation to enable or facilitate implementation
of the corporate responsibility to respect.116 Moreover, if legal personality is granted so
as to enable TNCs to operate beyond the effective regulatory spheres of both home and
host States as is often claimed, then this too suggests a failure to comply with the State
duty to protect.117
Private financial institutions and stock exchanges are both creatures of and
regulated by statute. Accordingly, legislative schemes that enable them to support the
global economic activities of TNCs should also come under scrutiny. While legislation
mandating sustainability reporting by companies that list on stock exchanges might be a
sound first step in terms of policy, it may not be sufficient to discharge the duty to
protect. As with corporate law, legislation that creates a private enterprise such as a stock
exchange and enables it to raise global capital in support of TNC conduct may be in
breach of an obligation to regulate and adjudicate TNC conduct if the legislation does not
integrate mechanisms that could prevent and remedy human rights violations by the TNC
that is to receive the equity financing.
Finally, the conduct of judicial organs is also identified in Article 4. National
courts are instrumentalities of the State, as much a part of the State as the executive or
legislative branches.118 If the State duty to regulate and adjudicate includes a duty to
provide access to justice for victims of human rights violations, then home State courts
are under an obligation to facilitate this access. This could have implications for the
interpretation of common law doctrines such as forum non conveniens, or for the
116
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availability of legal aid to foreign plaintiffs to ensure effective access to justice.119 This
analysis highlights the complementary relationship in the Framework between the State
duty to protect and the need for effective access to remedies.
The above are all examples of home State separate delict responsibility, as
opposed to direct responsibility. However, separate delict responsibility may give rise to
direct responsibility in certain circumstances. One example is under Article 16 of the
ILC Articles, which McCorquodale and Simons have convincingly argued could, under
certain circumstances, make the home State of an export credit agency complicit in the
wrongful conduct of the host State in relation to TNC projects, as well as complicit in
violations of international criminal law by TNCs themselves.120 Beyond Article 16, it is
possible that direct home State responsibility may arise through separate delict
responsibility if principles of “common sense causation” guide the analysis.121
According to Becker, drawing upon the work of H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honoré, once
separate delict responsibility is engaged, the State may be responsible for unattributable
acts that are causally linked to the State’s own wrongdoing. While detailed exploration
of Becker’s analysis is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is worth noting that causes are
understood as “interventions in the existing or expected state of affairs.”122 Significantly,
as the inquiry into what is a cause is “deeply connected to the context in which the
inquiry takes place,” and a “function of human habit, custom, convention or normative
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expectation,” causation is revealed as a relative concept.123 Thus, what a TNC or home
State might view as a normal state of affairs (the provision of home State support to TNC
conduct abroad) may appear to be a cause of a human rights violation to the individual
victim or impacted local community within the host State. This provides a link to the
TWAIL analysis earlier in this chapter. If the international law of State responsibility
reflected host State local community perspectives on causation, then home States would
be directly responsible for human rights violations associated with TNC conduct.124
Moreover, as Becker carefully documents, the theories of attribution reflected in the
international law of State responsibility have evolved over time to reflect the prevailing
understanding of the power relationship between State and non-state actors.125 The
international legal order of the Twentieth Century emphasised the sovereignty of the
State and a strict distinction between the State and the private conduct of non-State
actors, a legal order that is reflected in the non-attribution principle and the separate
delict theory.126 A question for the 21st Century is whether the strict public/private divide
reflected in the separate delict theory accurately reflects either the power relationship
between home States and TNCs, or the normative principles that should guide the
direction of international governance.127 This is a particularly pertinent issue in light of
the recent global economic crisis and the response of States. The line between the public
and private sectors of the global economy does not appear to be so clearly drawn today as
it did even in the very recent past.

4. The UN Principles of Responsible Investment
If the analysis above is correct, then what in practice is required of home States to
comply with the duty to protect? The answer is not obvious. This Part will explore one
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idea: whether State regulation mandating that institutional investors adhere to the UN
Principles of Responsible Investment (UNPRI) might be sufficient for compliance with
the State duty to protect.
The UNPRI were developed in 2005 by a group of institutional investors from 12
countries (the Investor Group), and “supported by a 70 person multi-stakeholder group of
experts from the investment industry, intergovernmental and governmental organizations,
civil society and academia.”128 The United Nations Environment Programme Finance
Initiative (UNEP FI)129 and the UN Global Compact130 coordinated the process, although
“UNEP did not formally supervise the drafting.”131 The UNPRI is open to signatories
from asset owners, including pension funds, investment managers, and professional
service partners.132 The UNPRI were launched in April 2006, and as of May 2009 there
were 538 signatories and $US 18,087 trillion worth of assets under management.133
The UNPRI are specifically designed as voluntary and aspirational Principles that
provide a “menu of possible actions for incorporating ESG (environmental, social and
governance) issues into mainstream investment decision-making and ownership
practices.”134 Indeed, application of the principles may be qualified by the fiduciary
duties that institutional investors owe to act in the best long-term interests of their
beneficiaries. The success of the UNPRI rests in part on the belief that “environmental,
social, and corporate governance (ESG) issues can affect the performance of investment
portfolios (to varying degrees across companies, sectors, regions, asset classes and
through time)”.135
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The UNPRI consists of six core Principles, supported by “possible actions”. The
Principles are:
1. We will incorporate environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) issues
into investment analysis and decision-making processes.
2. We will be active owners and incorporate ESG issues into our ownership policies
and practices.
3. We will seek appropriate disclosure on ESG issues by the entities in which we
invest.
4. We will promote acceptance and implementation of the Principles within the
investment industry.
5. We will work together to enhance our effectiveness in implementing the
Principles.
6. We will report on our activities and progress towards implementing the
Principles.136
State legislation mandating that institutional investors adopt the UNPRI could
overcome reluctance among institutional investors to implement the Principles in
situations where it might not be clear whether doing so would be in keeping with their
fiduciary obligations. This would satisfy a key concern that ESG criteria should still be
applied even if to do so were not clearly in the best financial interests of beneficiaries.137
It would not, however, address the concern that the UNPRI as currently conceived do not
in fact require signatories to actually incorporate ESG factors into their ultimate portfolio
choices.138 Nor would it address the question of whether ESG criteria fully incorporate
human rights.139
Another concern from a human rights perspective relates to the possible actions
proposed under Principle 2 on active ownership.

Specifically, the proposed active

ownership actions include the suggestions that institutional investors: exercise voting
rights; develop an engagement capability with companies; file shareholder resolutions;
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and engage with companies on ESG issues.140 On its face, this sounds like exactly the
kind of active shareholder engagement that is essential for the protection of human rights.
However, recent experience has shown that shareholder proposals sometimes do not
accurately express the concerns of the communities they purport to be advancing.141 As
socially responsible investment firms are themselves businesses that have a responsibility
to respect rights, it may be that State regulation implementing the duty to protect should
require shareholders to exercise their own due diligence and “recognize the agency of
affected communities by consulting with them before devising human rights-focused
shareholder proposals.”142 Related to this point is a concern that the UNPRI in its current
form “suggests a policy of engagement with companies rather than screening or avoiding
stocks based on ESG criteria” in part because the Principles “are generally designed for
large investors that are highly diversified and have large stakes in companies, often
making divestment or avoidance impractical.”143 Yet this may create a conflict between
the financial interests of investors who hope to profit from the venture and the rights of
communities opposed to the project continuing in any form, who might view a
shareholder divestment strategy as essential to their struggle.
Thus, while States mandating that institutional investors comply with the UNPRI
could lead to improvements in business compliance with the responsibility to respect
human rights by exerting soft pressures on businesses to consider ESG issues, it would
not alone be sufficient for compliance with the State duty to protect human rights as
explored in this chapter. As the SRSG often states, there is “no single silver bullet”.144
Detailed study of additional measures is beyond the scope of this chapter, however, some
possible suggestions might include statutorily expanding the types of claimants that can
bring derivative actions against companies,145 mandating the creation of company level
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grievance mechanisms, and statutorily ensuring the possibility of private law claims
brought by victims of human rights violations against home State TNCs in home State
courts.

Conclusions
The State duty to protect is best understood as a duty that attaches to State organs,
and requires all States, including home States, to exercise due diligence to prevent and
remedy human rights abuses by all businesses that benefit from State organ conduct.
Preoccupation with the extraterritorial reach of home State laws serves as a distraction
from the central issue in the business and human rights debate: how to ensure that the
institutional structures of the global economy which facilitate transnational corporate
conduct are designed to demand that human rights be respected. Placing the duty to
protect squarely on the shoulders of both home and host States acknowledges the
difference in the capacity to regulate experienced by home and host States. Indeed, the
work of TWAIL scholars suggests that such lack of capacity (or will) on the part of Third
World host States is a direct result of the colonial tendencies of the international legal
order. This appears to be implicitly acknowledged by the SRSG, for while the State duty
to protect is identified as the most fundamental principle of the Framework, the
discussion of the duty is never framed as a reprimand of host States. Instead, the State
duty to protect includes a clear recognition of the importance of international cooperation
and shared responsibility.
The analysis in this chapter has also underscored the complementary nature of the
responsibilities in the Framework. If home States are indeed obligated to comply with
the State duty to protect, then compliance must include structuring State institutions so as
to both facilitate corporate compliance with the responsibility to respect rights, and
facilitate access to remedies by victims of human rights abuses. This is not to suggest
that without legal reforms the corporate responsibility to respect is meaningless or that
non-legal remedies do not have a role to play. Rather, given the complementary nature of
the responsibilities in the Framework, compliance by all States with the duty to protect is
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essential if the root cause of the problem – the “governance gaps created by
globalization”146 – are ever to be fully filled.
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